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The problem of war aims and the Treaty  
of Versailles
John Callaghan
Why did Britain go to war in 1914? The answer that generated popular 
approval concerned the defence of Belgian neutrality, defiled by German 
invasion in the execution of the Schlieffen Plan. Less appealing, and 
therefore less invoked for public consumption, but broadly consistent 
with this promoted justification, was Britain’s long-standing interest in 
maintaining a balance of power on the continent, which a German victory 
would not only disrupt, according to Foreign Office officials, but replace 
with a ‘political dictatorship’ inimical to political freedom.1 Yet only 6 days 
before the British declaration of war, on 30 July, the chairman of the Liberal 
Foreign Affairs Group, Arthur Ponsonby, informed Prime Minister Asquith 
that ‘nine tenths of the [Liberal] party’ supported neutrality. Asquith 
privately came to a similar estimate, as did the Manchester Guardian.2
These calculations proved to be very wide of the mark. Only four 
members of the government privately resigned in protest when the decision 
for war was taken and two of them recanted before the decision became 
public. Dissenters later complained of having been kept in the dark during 
the July crisis, of secret diplomacy and secret entanglements, much as 
foreign policy critics had complained, intermittently, for years past. As the 
individuals who favoured intervention went to work – Grey, his Foreign 
Office advisers, Eyre Crowe and Arthur Nicolson, Winston Churchill, 
much of the Conservative Party leadership – supported by newspapers 
such as The Times and the Spectator – the dissenters were counselled to 
hold their peace as delicate negotiations to avoid war proceeded. Norman 
Angell launched the British Neutrality League on 28 July and Graham 
Wallas set up the British Neutrality Committee on the 31 July but the 
mass of Radicals in Parliament remained silent and by the time these 
groups met it was already too late to affect decision making. In any case, 
many observers thought there was little to worry about; as late as the 
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3 August the press reported that no British Expeditionary Force would 
be sent to the continent and any involvement in the war would be a 
limited naval commitment (though the Tory press was already demanding 
much more and there was a sense in some quarters that the war might 
prove popular).
A crisis meeting of the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) of the 
Second International convened in Brussels on 29 July, with Keir Hardie 
and Bruce Glasier in attendance for the British. Here the delegates 
resolved to organise demonstrations against a possible war but could 
conceive of no other actions. When Angelica Balabanova reminded the 
other leaders of the Vaillant–Keir Hardie resolution (at Copenhagen in 
1910) to stop war by general strike she elicited only surprise and lack 
of interest.3 The ILP’s Labour Leader and the Daily Herald supported 
demonstrations against war on the 30 and 31 July, respectively. Fifteen 
to twenty thousand people assembled to protest against war in Trafalgar 
Square on Sunday 2 August. The main speakers included Hardie and 
Arthur Henderson, supported by prominent trade unionists like Bob 
Smillie and Ben Tillet. Secret alliances and pacts that could lead to war 
without the pretence of broader consultation were denounced. The Cabinet 
doubters were informed by similar worries – they could see that Britain’s 
involvement was inevitable given the naval commitments to France that 
Grey insisted upon. On 3 August, Grey addressed the House of Commons 
warning that neutrality would have numerous ‘perilous consequences’ 
for Britain’s vital interests and that Belgian independence had to be the 
‘governing factor’ in determining Britain’s stance; failure to defend it 
and the whole of Western Europe would succumb to a single dominant 
power. With the Conservative Party and the Irish Parliamentary Party 
supporting Grey, it was Ramsay MacDonald who first questioned the 
Foreign Secretary’s rhetoric in the Commons, pointing to the massive 
disproportion between intervention for the defence of Belgium and the 
prospect of ‘a whole European war’ which would change the continental 
map.4 Twenty-two Radical MPs followed MacDonald in resolving for 
neutrality immediately after the 2 hour Commons debate was brought 
to a close. Neutralists dominated the adjournment debate that followed 
that evening, but it did not matter. Overnight Asquith persuaded two of 
the Cabinet rebels to change their minds. Grey and Asquith composed 
an ultimatum to Germany on the morning of the 4 August and war was 
declared by the king that night. In explaining to the House why Britain 
had gone to war, two days later, Asquith focused solely on the question of 
Belgian neutrality.
On 5 August Labour’s Executive blamed the outcome on secret diplo-
macy but the parliamentary group voted for war credits hours later and 
the War Emergency Workers’ Committee was set up to monitor economic 
and social problems that the war might create. The leadership resolved 
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that ‘under the circumstances it was impossible for this country to remain 
neutral’. MacDonald resigned as party chairman and Henderson took his 
position. Those Radical MPs who remained convinced that the war was 
an avoidable disaster took a similar view to Labour’s Executive, voting for 
war credits so that Britain might prevail in the conflict, yet maintaining 
their criticism of Grey. A Labour circular issued on 7 August attributed 
the conflict to balance of power politics and secret diplomacy, as the 
Radicals had argued in the House. Grey was blamed for committing Britain 
to France without consulting Parliament or informing the public. In the 
second week of August MacDonald helped to set up the UDC, which 
continued to question Britain’s role in the war along these lines. However, 
Labour’s Executive moved just as rapidly towards practical measures 
of support for the war effort. By the end of August it was promoting 
enlistment to the armed forces and had agreed a political truce for the 
duration, following the TUC’s decision to support an industrial truce. 
Though the ILP opposed the war, on both pacifist and socialist grounds, it 
lost members and it was soon clear that the labour movement was solidly 
behind the war effort, as were most Radical MPs, most Irish MPs and 
most feminists. Even the UDC – and doubting figures such as Hardie and 
MacDonald – agreed that the war had to be fought to a finish now that it 
had started.
Expectations and aims
Some of Grey’s critics foresaw that the war would be ‘catastrophic’. They 
had good reason. France, Germany and Russia had all massively increased 
their armies in 1913.5 Josiah Wedgwood predicted it would also cause 
revolution when he criticised the foreign secretary’s ‘jingo’ speech in the 
Commons on the evening of the 3 August. The Manchester Guardian 
drew attention to Grey’s attempt to minimise the ‘appalling catastrophe’ 
of war the next day and on the 6 August Kitchener, the newly appointed 
war secretary, told the Cabinet that it would have to ‘put armies of millions 
in the field’ and expect the war to last years.6 This was at a time when 
many people expected little more than naval engagements and a resolution 
of the entire crisis by the end of the year. Yet within a month of the 
commencement of fighting casualties had reached around 300,000 on 
the Western Front, though there was no indication of this in the British 
press.7 On 15 October, The British Labour Party and the War explained 
that Germany had caused the war and that Britain fought for democracy 
against German militarism, as well as in defence of Belgian neutrality. 
Labour’s annual conference, planned for January 1915, was cancelled. By 
the end of the year Britain alone had sustained 90,000 casualties.8 Enthu-
siasm for the war nevertheless remained high and prominent figures from 
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the Labour movement were drawn into war work, serving on a variety 
of ad hoc state committees, tribunals and commissions.
The purpose for many was to ‘see it through’ but loftier, more ambitious, 
even spiritual targets were also set. Speaking in Dublin in September 
1914 Asquith said the purpose of the war was ‘the substitution of force 
… a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right, 
and established and enforced by common rule’. David Lloyd George, 
speaking in London on the 19 September, told a mass meeting at the 
Queen’s Hall that he envied young people who now had the opportunity 
of sacrifice in the ‘great war for the emancipation of Europe from the 
thraldom of a military caste’. They had been ‘living in a sheltered valley 
for generations’ but fate had raised them to a level where they could see 
the things that really matter ‘the great peaks we had forgotten, of Honour, 
Duty, Patriotism … the great pinnacle of Sacrifice pointing like a rugged 
finger to Heaven’. Asquith and Grey were both brought to tears by the 
peroration, relieved that the great Radical had spoken so emphatically 
in support of their decisions.9 Similar nonsense was spoken and written 
in Germany and France and, as Marc Ferro points out, it elicited similar 
sentiments of ‘mass exuberance, mysticism, patriotic frenzy, appeals to 
the judgement of history, to divine mercy’.10 All parties to the war claimed 
that they were fighting for civilisation – even Germany, whose army 
engaged in atrocities and cultural vandalism in Belgium in August 1914. 
Regime change in Berlin was already being spoken of, together with an 
international settlement that would reduce the risks of future wars, if not 
abolish them altogether.
The inter-Allied conference of socialist and labour parties, meeting on 
14 February 1915, despite the patriotic sentiment that it represented, was 
not content to confine its arguments to those of mainstream opinion. It 
referred to ‘the profound general causes of the European conflict, itself a 
monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society 
and of the policy of Colonial dependencies and aggressive Imperialism 
… in which every Government has its share of responsibility’. A victory 
for German militarism would destroy democracy and liberty in Europe, 
it claimed, but there could be no justification for ‘the economic crushing 
of Germany’ when the war was over. The governments of Germany and 
Austria were at fault but not the people of those countries. The socialists 
of the Allied countries, the conference asserted, ‘demand that Belgium 
shall be liberated … that throughout all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine 
to the Balkans, those populations that have been annexed by force shall 
receive the right to freely dispose of themselves’. The resolution then 
stressed that the delegates were ‘inflexibly resolved to fight until victory’. 
However, these delegates would also oppose any attempt to transform 
an essentially defensive war into a war of conquest. In so doing they 
sought a justification for supporting the war compatible with their record 
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of criticism of secret diplomacy, militarism and imperialism, and their 
support for democracy and even ‘the peaceful Federation of the United 
States of Europe and the world’.11
In effect Labour argued that Germany’s bad behaviour outweighed 
‘the contributory negligence of British foreign policy in consequence of 
its imperialism, irrationalism, secret diplomacy, arms trading, and capital-
ism’.12 H. G. Wells came to the assistance of proponents of this argument 
when he coined the phrase ‘war that will end war’ – a catchphrase that 
became popular by the end of 1914.13 The defeat of Germany would be 
the defeat of German militarism and the making of a lasting peace. Thus 
one could support the war effort while calling for new principles and 
institutions that would make war much more unlikely in the future. Before 
the end of August 1914 G. Lowes Dickinson, a Cambridge academic and 
Liberal, was already drafting a plan for a future League of Nations with 
this end in view. But open opposition to the war was confined to persecuted 
minorities, like the 16,500 officially recorded conscientious objectors. 
Fear may have been a factor in keeping the numbers so small. For all the 
rhetoric denouncing ‘Prussianism’ Britain itself became much more 
intolerant, authoritarian and centralised as the conflict unfolded and 
people thought to be opposed to the war – like MacDonald and Bertrand 
Russell – were made to pay for their dissent. Repression alone, however, 
does not explain the small scale of open opposition.
Even pre-war peace societies such as the Quakers, the Peace Society, 
the National Peace Council and the International Arbitration League 
were thrown into confusion and division when the war began, while most 
of the churches enthusiastically rallied to its support.14 The need to moralise 
the conflict seems to have been met. British intervention was widely seen 
as fully justified. The 2.7 million volunteers to the armed forces of the 
first 24 months of the conflict were the most visible and important expres-
sion of this belief. More people opposed compulsory military service 
than the war itself, as did the TUC, in September 1915, and the Labour 
conference of January 1916. But the Military Service Act, which came 
into force in March 1916, was careful to exempt Ireland, where opposition 
was widespread, and provoked none of the resignations from the coalition 
government that Labour had threatened. It was left to the tiny No-
Conscription Fellowship – led by ILP and Liberal dissidents like Fenner 
Brockway, Clifford Allen and Bertrand Russell – to campaign against the 
Act. The organisation claimed 15,000 members by the summer of 1916 
but was probably exaggerating.15 The vast majority of Labour and trade 
union people accepted that efficient prosecution of the war made conscrip-
tion necessary. Opponents knew that they were isolated and likely to face 
harassment and imprisonment if their opposition became active. The ILP 
found its membership falling after it opposed the war in a statement of 
13 August 1914. Within the BSP it took until 1916 before its pro-war 
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leaders, like H. M. Hyndman and Robert Blatchford, were forced to resign 
from the organisation. Membership, never very high, shrank during the 
war. Other centres of opposition were even smaller.
The UDC, Angell and Brailsford
Among those who took a critical stance, the UDC was the most important 
hub of sustained thinking about the causes of the war and how it should 
end. It brought together neutralists, advocates of a League of Nations 
(or some sort of international authority), isolationists and others who 
believed that the war was unnecessary and would solve nothing. Most 
were Liberals, many would join the Labour Party when the war ended.16 
The UDC could not develop a ‘party line’ on the war, given the differences 
within its membership, but it started with guiding principles. Many of its 
arguments came to the surface within the Labour Party when the events 
of 1917, especially the revolution in Russia, encouraged proponents of 
a new statement of war aims. Labour leaders, such as MacDonald and 
Henderson, subscribed to the guiding principles of the UDC, namely that 
there should be no territorial adjustments because of the war without 
the consent of the people affected by them; that parliamentary sanction 
should be required before Britain entered any arrangement, undertaking 
or treaty; that British foreign policy should not be guided by balance 
of power principles but should aim for the establishment of a Concert 
of the Powers and international council, operating in public view for 
the arbitration of international disputes, together with an international 
court capable of interpretation and enforcement; finally, that any peace 
settlement should aim for drastic reduction of armaments by consent 
of all the belligerents and nationalisation of their arms industries and 
regulation of their arms exports. In May 1916, a fifth principle was adopted 
at J.  A. Hobson’s prompting, intended to eliminate economic warfare 
by the promotion of ‘free commercial intercourse among all nations by 
expanding the principle of the Open Door’. Protectionism and autarky 
led to war, according to this old liberal argument, free trade generated 
interdependence, prosperity and co-operation.
Norman Angell had developed the thesis that war would be rendered 
futile by virtue of growing economic interdependence in his 1909 pamphlet, 
‘Europe’s Optical Illusion’, subsequently known as ‘The Great Illusion’. 
When war broke out he argued that popular opinion in Britain had been 
mobilised for the elimination of ‘the evil doctrine of Nietzcheanism and 
brute force’, as represented by the German state, in the hope that Europe 
could be made forever free from war and militarism. The war, on this 
reading, was not so much against another nation as against an ‘evil spirit’.17 
This was a favourite trope of the politicians and press in Britain. Pro-war 
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propagandists, such as Wells and Professor Gilbert Murray, equated 
victory for the Entente with the defeat of both militarism and autocracy 
(even in Russia). Angell, a neutralist in August 1914, wanted an Allied 
victory once the war began, but stressed that crushing Germany would 
not achieve the desired results, it would simply ‘expose us to a renewal 
[of war] at no distant date [and] fasten the shackles of militarism more 
firmly than ever upon the long-suffering peoples of Europe.’18 Before the 
year was out he felt the need to argue against those in officialdom who 
wanted Germany partitioned or wiped off the map. Already there was 
talk of returning Alsace-Lorraine to France, of the creation of a new 
Poland at Germany’s expense, of the transfer of German colonies to other 
hands, of the destruction of her fleet, the dethronement of the Kaiser 
and the dismemberment of Austria. Against all this Angell cautioned that 
without Germany’s consent no peace could endure. States have powers 
of recuperation; the national spirit can be provoked by vengeful defeat 
and no balance of power could survive under such circumstances. For 
‘Prussianism’ to be defeated, as political rhetoric insisted it must, it had 
to be recognised as a state of mind affecting all the Great Powers. To free 
ourselves from it, Angell insisted, we must promote mutual co-operation 
and display ‘a frank recognition that nations do form a society’, which 
can be regulated.
Lowes Dickinson put the point more forcefully for American readers 
in December 1914. If the war had been caused by militarism, secret 
diplomacy and intrigue, peace depended on an extension of democracy 
to international relations. Foreign policy would have to come under 
democratic scrutiny, the self-determination of nations would have to 
become a cardinal principle and armaments would have to be subject 
to national and international controls. Nations would have to submit 
their disputes to arbitration and conciliation by a ‘League of Europe’.19 
Thinking along these lines was inspired above all by the perception that 
war could be avoided. The way the First World Great had come about 
was at the root of this thinking. Though profound long-term causes of 
war – imperialism and capitalism – were often mentioned, the short-term 
unfolding of the July crisis from a dispute in the Balkans to a general 
European war by dint of alliances and the decisions of tiny elites was what 
critical analysis fixed upon. So when the Fabian Society, for example, set 
up an International Agreements Committee in January 1915, to investigate 
methods for maintaining peace, it generated a conference in May of that 
year, and two articles that appeared in the New Statesman in July, which 
focused on ‘Suggestions for the Prevention of War’. Leonard Woolf, at the 
centre of this endeavour, published International Government in 1916, 
which put a Fabian construction on the liberal argument that commerce 
drove global integration forward by forcing states to adopt global rules 
and regulations. Woolf showed that the process was already underway 
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and could be taken further by identifying issues on which states would 
submit to arbitration and conciliation by an International Court and an 
International Council over-representing the Great Powers and able to 
apply sanctions leading up to military force.20
Dissident opinion was divided and dynamic on many matters. H. N. 
Brailsford repeated many of Angell’s views in his account of The Origins 
of the Great War but his focus on the war as the postponed sequel to the 
Balkan War of 1912, explained it as a ‘co-operative crime’ of Germany 
and Russia, essentially concerned with the domination of Eastern Europe 
and utterly remote from any British interest. Both Britain and France, on 
this view, had been dragged into it by the ‘mechanical fatality’ of their 
alliance with the ‘unscrupulous and incalculable Empire’ of Tsarist Russia. 
Both should negotiate for peace, Brailsford argued in the winter of 1914, 
before they were dragged into a prolonged fight to determine who would 
dominate in the East.21 Bertrand Russell initially took a similar view to 
Brailsford. But when he looked to the war in the East, in November 1914, 
his loathing of Tsarist Russia and his admiration for German culture got 
the better of him. In a UDC pamphlet he openly accepted the argument 
that Germany in the East was defending civilisation against the backward 
Slavs.22 While the war in the East had what he called a certain ‘ethnic 
inevitability’, the war in the West was the result of alliances built in response 
to 1870 and the ‘folly’ of Germany’s naval programme. Russell soon dropped 
these pro-German sentiments. But he actively campaigned against the 
war, later as a prominent member of the NCF. He published his most 
detailed study of British foreign policy in December 1915 in reply to 
officially sponsored propaganda written by Professor Gilbert Murray. 
Russell now accepted that Germany bore the greatest responsibility for 
the outbreak of the war, and its subsequent conduct, but held fast to the 
conviction that the ‘maxims’ of British foreign policy had led to Britain’s 
unnecessary involvement. He maintained that Britain’s foreign policy since 
1904 had strengthened the war party in Germany, weakened the friends 
of peace and supported France and Russia ‘in enterprises which were 
inherently indefensible’.
As the war dragged on, Russell repeatedly warned of its dangers to 
European civilisation. Only pride, fear and hatred prolonged the conflict. 
In July 1916, he wrote leaflets for the NCF in which he referred to Germany 
having ‘repeatedly offered terms of peace’.23 At the end of the year he 
argued that Bethmann-Hollweg’s peace note, delivered to the American 
embassy on 12 December 1916, signalled that Germany was receptive to 
peace overtures. At the same time, he warned against the sort of peace 
that the advocates of ‘total victory’ would bring about – a peace based 
on fear and humiliation. This was what the new coalition government 
formed by Lloyd George promised. Russell wrote an open letter to President 
Woodrow Wilson, as these steps were taken in December 1916, in the 
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belief that the USA could put a stop to the unnecessary slaughter.24 But 
he was sceptical about ideas for a League of Nations and in January 1917 
argued that such a body could easily become a new Holy Alliance dedicated 
to maintenance of the international status quo.25
One thing these dissenters were agreed upon was the death of the 
Liberal Party and the better prospect of the Labour Party championing 
an enlightened foreign policy. UDC arguments reiterated many of the 
criticisms of foreign policy that had been common currency among Labour 
and Radical MPs since the beginning of the Boer War. But Labour was 
seen as the rising force that could make alternative approaches to foreign 
policy a reality, especially after the Liberal Party split between supporters 
of Asquith and Lloyd George in 1916. Labour’s practical support for 
the war effort did not automatically contradict such hopes. Even UDC 
members regarded a British defeat in the war as unthinkable. Many 
Labour men – like Henderson – supported the war effort but did not 
endorse the foreign policies that had led to it and believed wars could 
be avoided if the right people and policies were put in place. French and 
British socialists meeting on 14 February 1915 in London made that 
clear, as did the Labour and trade union conferences of 1916 and 1917.26 
Labour’s co-operation in the war effort, moreover, was believed to give 
it a stake in the construction of a just peace. A just peace would mean 
meeting the claims of workers in Britain and asserting the values of the 
Labour movement in the international arena. Before the end of 1915 
it was clear that President Woodrow Wilson and the USA might play 
a role in strengthening that case.27 Even the Cabinet considered some 
sort of international peacekeeping body in the summer of 1915. Wilson, 
as Philip Snowden pointed out to Labour supporters around the same 
time, publicly aligned himself with the arguments of the UDC.28 In the 
presidential campaign of 1916 he transformed this more radical case 
into a national agenda, while Britain seemingly moved in the opposite 
direction under Lloyd George.
While Wilson argued for a ‘peace without victory’ his supporters in 
the USA thought they had seen the first signs of hope in Britain when 
the Labour Party conference unanimously voted for a ‘an international 
League to enforce the maintenance of peace’ in January 1917.29 Wilson’s 
‘Peace without Victory’ speech had been delivered the day before the 
conference began on 22 January and the delegates stood cheering when 
it was read to them. In France the socialist party gave Wilson’s address 
a similar reception, though both parties remained committed to military 
victory. Small groups of socialists – without French or British participation 
– had met at Zimmerwald (5–8 September 1915) and Kienthal (April 
1916) demanding a ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’. The Russian 
Revolution and the overthrow of Nicholas II on 15 March made such 
demands urgent problems for the Allies. The Provisional Government 
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formed immediately after the Tsar’s abdication contained liberals from 
the Duma, but the Petrograd Soviet was led by Zimmerwaldists committed 
to a negotiated peace and some of these entered a coalition Provisional 
Government formed on 5 May.30 Initially these events did not threaten 
a separate peace in the East. On the contrary, the Allies and the Provisional 
Government expected a more efficient prosecution of the war now that 
the Tsar was gone. Even so a ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’ 
was not what the Allied governments had been planning for.
Secret treaties
Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies under Asquith, drew 
up a secret memorandum as early as March 1915, called ‘The Spoils’, in 
which he outlined the imperial gains in Africa, Asia, the Middle East 
and the Pacific that Britain could expect to make out of the war.31 Most 
of Germany’s colonies had fallen into British hands by February 1916 
and arrangements were made with France, Japan and the Dominions 
to make these losses permanent. Secret deals were also made with Italy 
and Tsarist Russia involving major territorial transfers and plans were 
laid for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. 
Publicly, however, the talk was of restoring Belgium, perhaps destroying 
Germany as a naval power and punishing it for breaking international law, 
while somehow turning it into a democracy.32 When the USA entered the 
war in April 1917, President Wilson was informed of the secret treaties 
and lost no time reiterating his demand for ‘peace without victory’. But 
American entry into the war reinforced the case of those who wanted 
an Allied military victory over Germany by making it more realistic, as 
did their initial reading of the revolution in Russia. Many of those of who 
wanted a negotiated peace recognised the problem. But Wilson’s rhetoric 
combined with that of the Provisional Government in Petrograd also 
strengthened the prospect of a just and lasting peace. Labour was at any 
rate now prepared to consider a proposal of the Dutch and Scandinavian 
socialist parties that a conference of the social democrats of the belligerent 
countries should be held on neutral ground (Stockholm) to formulate 
peace terms – to the extent that it decided in May to send a delegation 
to confer with the Russian socialists.33 In the event the delegation was 
refused permission to depart by the Sailor’s and Fireman Union when it 
attempted to board ship at Aberdeen. Lloyd George meanwhile instructed 
Henderson to visit Russia in response to demands from the Provisional 
Government for urgent discussion of war aims and associated Allied fears 
that Russia would negotiate a separate peace. In Petrograd Henderson 
discovered strong support for the proposed conference in Stockholm 
and returned convinced of the need for negotiations before the Eastern 
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front collapsed completely. Labour’s Executive came out in favour of the 
Stockholm conference upon his return and an emergency conference, 
convened to discuss the proposal on 10 August, supported it by a large 
majority – the first time the unions had wavered about the ‘fight to a 
finish’ line. Henderson was forced to resign from the Cabinet on this issue 
(to be replaced by Labour MP George Barnes) and both the British and 
French governments scuppered the proposed international conference 
by refusing to grant passports.
The episode is significant chiefly as evidence of new thinking among 
the war’s Labour supporters. More evidence was supplied by a successful 
TUC resolution in September demanding a voice for the working class 
at any future peace conference. Labour’s Executive used this prompt to 
declare the need for a statement about war aims to be ratified by an 
inter-Allied conference of socialist parties as the first step in uniting the 
left of all the belligerent countries.34 But before this was taken any further 
the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. On 22 November Leon Trotsky 
published the secret treaties entered into by the Allied powers, exposing 
what he denounced as secret capitalist diplomacy and imperialist robbery.35 
By the middle of December the Manchester Guardian began publishing 
the details and continued to do so into 1918. They were greeted in left-wing 
circles with ‘shame and anger’ but also as weapons to support the cause 
of Woodrow Wilson.36 They also permitted the Bolsheviks to strike a 
noble pose, since among the deals they repudiated were those that would 
have annexed the Straits and Constantinople to Russia and given it ‘full 
liberty of action’ in northern Iran.37
The Bolshevik disclosures had revealed, according to the secretary of 
the ISB, that the governments of the Allies were ‘in opposition to the 
traditions of our Movement … in denial of the moral conceptions which 
underlie our Movement’. These governments had not responded with any 
enthusiasm to Wilson’s agenda. But Labour’s Memorandum of War Aims 
– approved by a special conference of the TUC and Labour Party on 28 
December 1917 – echoed Wilson by claiming that the ‘fundamental 
purpose of the British Labour Movement in supporting the continuance 
of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy’. 
To achieve this, it went on to list all of the demands associated with the 
UDC – including a League of Nations, open diplomacy and the self-
determination of nations. Denouncing imperialism in general the Memo-
randum wanted the administration of dependent peoples by a commission 
of the League of Nations in places like the Middle East and envisaged a 
vast neutral state composed of all tropical African territories south of 
the Sahara and north of the Zambezi.38
In January, Lloyd George made a speech to the British Trade Union 
League at Caxton Hall that appeared to embrace Wilsonism, persuading 
Henderson that the prime minister stood closer to Labour than ever 
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before.39 Three days later Wilson unveiled his Fourteen Points. Labour 
now demanded a joint statement on war aims from the USA and British 
governments and called for an international conference of socialist parties 
to consider the Memorandum, adding that the social democrats in the 
Central Powers should state their own war aims and demand that their 
governments do the same. In February, an inter-allied conference of 
socialist parties took place and the Memorandum was expanded, though 
not significantly altered. In March, the rapacious Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
was concluded and the fact that only the Independent Social Democratic 
Party voted against it in the Reichstag did not augur well for Labour’s 
initiative. In fact Vandervelde and Huysmans, on behalf of the ISB, told 
the SPD majority that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk stood in complete 
disregard of the democratic peace that the inter-Allied conference 
had just endorsed.
The ISB began to collect responses to the Memorandum from the 
social democrats in the belligerent countries. While the Austrian social 
democrats accepted the proposed League of Nations, the principle of no 
annexations and indemnities, and the right of self-determination, it cast 
doubt on the idea that democracy could emerge victorious from the 
defeat of either side in the struggle. A negotiated peace was needed and 
the right of self-determination must be extended to all colonies. The 
Berliner Tageblatt rejected one-sided indemnities altogether and the SPD 
theoretical journal Die Neue Zeit wondered why the idea of international 
control over colonies should be limited to tropical Africa and not extended, 
say, to Ireland. Was this not a cover for the extension of ‘English world 
hegemony’ it wondered? The social democrats of Germany and Austria 
certainly did not see how democratic regimes could emerge from their 
military defeat.40 Heinrich Cunow, editor of Die Neue Zeit, reacted to 
Labour’s proposals for the democratic control of foreign policy by observing 
that such general principles already had the support of the SPD majority, 
Bethmann-Hollweg and Pope Benedict XV, among many others. Such 
talk was cheap. Labour wanted the self-determination of nations but did 
not mention Ireland, Egypt, India, the former Boer States, Cyprus or 
Malta in its Memorandum.41 Even the socialists of the neutral countries 
had sympathy for this argument while the Marxist USPD went much 
further, stating that a durable peace required the socialists in every country 
to fight their own governments and prepare for socialism. This was as 
far as the discussion went. Interest in a negotiated peace in any case 
declined with the German spring offensive of 1918 and the Allied riposte 
that began in August. Germany’s defeat soon followed. Social Democrats 
entered the government at the beginning of October under politically 
volatile circumstances and by 12 October Germany accepted Wilson’s 
demand for the evacuation of occupied territory. Soon the threat of social 
revolution in Germany became apparent.
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The general election and the peace conference
In the December 1918 general election all prominent ILP candidates 
and UDC figures who stood as Labour candidates were defeated. The 
UDC now had 650,000 members but the 59 Labour MPs who formed the 
official opposition were almost all former trade union officials sponsored 
by unions. Labour’s election manifesto had referred to ‘the present world 
catastrophe’, which it took as evidence of ‘the culmination and collapse of a 
distinctive industrial civilisation … the workers will not seek to reconstruct’. 
The Paris Peace Conference opened on 18 January and in February the 
pre-war Second International took the first step to reconstruct itself at 
Berne. The Berne conference objected to most aspects of the peace set-
tlement unfolding and conveyed its opposition to Clemenceau through a 
delegation, which included Henderson and MacDonald. MacDonald was 
one of the first in Britain to denounce the proposed League of Nations as 
a sham.42 It would be dominated by the victorious powers and represent 
states not peoples. By June 1919, however, Labour’s annual conference 
accepted that the League’s deficiencies might be remedied43 and there was 
already evidence of popular enthusiasm for the League in, for example, 
the growth of the League of Nations Union, formed in 1918 only days 
before the armistice. But Morel, Hobson and other UDC figures who had 
joined the Labour Party saw only a Carthaginian peace in the decisions 
taken in Paris. The Berne conference agreed with them but made clear, as 
Labour had done in the Memorandum, that the sort of League it wanted 
– representing peoples not governments and able to enforce its decisions 
in collective action – depended on the prior triumph of socialism and 
democracy in the participating countries.44 Nevertheless the victorious 
powers stood accused of malicious intent to punish Germany, establishing 
a new balance of power and laying the foundations for economic damage 
in Europe for years to come. The NEC concluded that the peace treaty 
‘was defective not so much because of this or that detail of wrong done, 
but fundamentally, in that it accepts, and indeed is based on, the very 
political principles or premises which were the ultimate cause of this 
war’.45 Yet when the Treaty came before Parliament the Labour group 
approved it and subjected it to only mild criticisms.
No doubt some Labour members had travelled a long way in four 
years from the belief that the war was a justified defence of Belgian neutral-
ity to the realisation that it had been a catastrophe with identifiable causes 
susceptible to rational intervention. But others had always taken both 
views – that though the war must be fought to victory, it could have been 
avoided and many of its causes were forces and practices that Labour 
opposed on principle. By 1918, more people doubted that any great issue 
of principle could be identified to justify the carnage, but at least Wilson 
had invested the conflict with a noble meaning and goal. Labour’s immediate 
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rejection of almost everything connected with the peace settlement reflected 
the immense disappointment of those who had taken the ‘peace without 
victory’ slogan seriously. But root and branch rejection of the Treaty of 
Versailles never had popular support and it took only another few years 
for Labour’s leaders to adjust to the facts. By 1922, all were convinced 
that Britain had to make use of the existing League.
The numerous contradictions and inconsistencies in Labour’s thinking 
only became apparent with the passage of time. The Memorandum of 
War Aims not only wanted the world made safe for democracy, the peace 
it sought was said to depend on the spread of democracy to ‘all countries’ 
coupled with the frank abandonment of ‘every form of imperialism’. These 
preconditions were not likely to be realised soon. Yet Labour also wanted, 
‘forthwith’, a League of Nations, the suppression of secret diplomacy and 
the control of foreign policy by popularly elected legislatures. It envisaged 
progress towards the abolition of conscription and profit-making arma-
ments firms, as well as arms controls. Critics of the Memorandum observed 
that Labour did not envisage a British withdrawal from Empire or even 
propose consistent opposition to its imminent expansion. Did the party 
understand that such a global enterprise had to be policed, that the scale 
of defence needs was therefore also global and that the risks of future 
military conflict were correspondingly greater? Labour was committed 
to the trusteeship conception of empire and advocated international 
supervision of peoples deemed unable to govern themselves. In that sense 
the League of Nations’ mandates – associated with Jan Smuts – was an 
idea that can be traced to the work of Labour intellectuals as they pondered 
the future of the former German colonies. In practice the goal of trusteeship 
was often conflated with the prevailing condition of the Crown Colonies 
and British colonial policies at any particular time. Critics of the imperial 
reality existed but were few in number and mostly ignored. Complacency 
about the benevolence of the British Empire was deeply ingrained in the 
British political culture and the Labour Party fully shared the view that 
it was already an example of the trusteeship idea in action. The vast 
central African state, which Labour envisaged between the Sahara and 
the Zambezi under international supervision, was meant to deal with the 
German colonies only. Philip Snowden perceived a nationalist rather than 
internationalist mentality in this thinking.46 But he was a rare (and short-
lived) doubter. The more common condition was to give very little thought 
to the Empire at all. Certainly it seems unlikely that many Labour people 
had really thought much about the implications of Empire for any future 
Labour government. Yet through this portal Labour would accept foreign 
and defence policies which it officially abhorred in 1919.
The war’s immediate aftermath was admittedly an emotional time of 
exceptional events when Labour was only just emerging as a functioning 
political party. The desire for a more professional image and performance 
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in Parliament under MacDonald’s leadership after 1922 would make its 
own contribution to the process of ‘growing up’. The marginalisation of 
the party’ s principal foreign policy thinkers – Morel, Woolf, Brailsford, 
Hobson and the like – was an inevitable part of the process, as was the 
elimination of any rhetoric concerning the peace treaty that implied the 
sort of class analysis favoured by the Bolsheviks. In reality the national 
sentiment that had been encouraged and drawn upon for purposes of 
fighting the war could not be conjured away. From 1921, Labour’s foreign 
policy interests turned to the question of economic stability, economic 
growth and employment. Growing trade with Germany and Russia was 
proposed to address these issues. Linked to these interests was a growth 
in opposition to their continued punishment by economic or military 
means.47 In substance Labour’s policy was not much different to Lloyd 
George’s. However, resistance to the growing pragmatism of the PLP was 
kept alive by the anger and cynicism generated by the constant drip of 
decisions and events which came after the main peace settlement, such 
as British support for Poland during the Polish–Soviet conflict over 
Ukrainian territory (1919–21), the Anglo-Irish War (1919–21), the danger 
of war with Turkey (1922) and the crisis of reparations payments which 
led to French military occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Across the Empire 
resistance to British rule was such that the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, 
privately declared in 1919 that ‘every place is a storm-centre’.48 Some 
other people had taken Wilson’s rhetoric seriously, though neither Wilson 
nor British Labour paid much attention to them.49
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